This volume brings together thirteen papers on hinge epistemology written by Annalisa Coliva and published after her influential monographs Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (2010), Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology (2015). By mixing together Wittgenstein scholarship and systematic philosophy, they illuminate the significance of hinge epistemology for current debates on skepticism, relativism, realism and anti-realism, as well as alethic pluralism, and envision its possible extension to the epistemology of logic. Along the way, other varieties of hinge epistemology, such as Moyal-Sharrock’s, Pritchard’s, Williams’ and Wright’s, are considered, both with respect to Wittgenstein scholarship and in their own right.
قائمة المحتويات
Introduction; Acknowledgements; Credits; Part I In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology, Chapter One, Which Hinge Epistemology?; Chapter Two, Which Hinge Epistemology between Animal, Biscopic, and Constitutivist?; Chapter Three, “I Know, ” “I Know, ” “I Know”: Hinge Epistemology, Invariantism, and Skepticism; Chapter Four, Propositional and Doxastic Hinge Assumptions; Chapter Five, Are There Mathematical Hinges?; Part II Hinge Epistemology, Anti-Realism, and Relativism, Chapter Six, What Anti-realism About Hinges Could Possibly Be; Chapter Seven, Relativism and Hinge Epistemology; Chapter Eight, Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?; Chapter Nine, Rituals, Philosophy, Science, and Progress: Wittgenstein on Frazer; Bibliography; Author Index; Subject Index
عن المؤلف
Annalisa Coliva is Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine.