This book contains a collection of original and state-of-the-art contributions in rational choice and general equilibrium theory. Among the topics are preferences, demand, equilibrium, core allocations, and testable restrictions. The contributing authors are Daniel Mc Fadden, Rosa Matzkin, Emma Moreno-Garcia, Roger Lagunoff, Yakar Kannai, Myrna Wooders, James Moore, Ted Bergstrom, Luca Anderlini, Lin Zhou, Mark Bagnoli, Alexander Kovalenkov, Carlos Herves-Beloso, Michaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet, Andreu Mas-Colell and Nicholas Yannelis.
قائمة المحتويات
Revealed stochastic preference: a synthesis.- Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’.- The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games.- Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferences.- Remarks concerning concave utility functions on finite sets.- Walrasian versus quasi-competitive equilibrium and the core of a production economy.- Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces.- Comparative statics and laws of scarcity for games.- Existence of equilibria for economies with externalities and a measure space of consumers.- Identification of consumers’ preferences when their choices are unobservable.- Log-concave probability and its applications.- Notes on stochastic choice.
المزيد من الكتب الإلكترونية من نفس المؤلف (المؤلفين) / محرر
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