The Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, marked a critical turning point in the European theater of World War II. The massive landing on France’s coast had been meticulously planned for three years, and the Allies anticipated a quick and decisive defeat of the German forces. Many of the planners were surprised, however, by the length of time it ultimately took to defeat the Germans.
While much has been written about D-day, very little has been written about the crucial period from August to September, immediately after the invasion. In Rückzug, Joachim Ludewig draws on military records from both sides to show that a quick defeat of the Germans was hindered by excessive caution and a lack of strategic boldness on the part of the Allies, as well as by the Germans’ tactical skill and energy. This intriguing study, translated from German, not only examines a significant and often overlooked phase of the war, but also offers a valuable account of the conflict from the perspective of the German forces.
قائمة المحتويات
World War II German Military Ranks
Foreword
Author’s Acknowledgments
A Note on the English Edition
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
Part 1. The Initial Situation Facing OB West in the Middle of August 1944: The Situation in Northern France and the Allied Landings along the Mediterranean Coast
1. The German Reich’s Military-Political Situation: Development of the General Conditions up to the Summer of 1944
2. The Initial Situation on the Allied Side
3. Development of the Situation through the Middle of August 1944
4. The Initial Situation in Southern France
5. The Initial Situation in Northern France
Part 2. From the Retreat of the German Army in the West to the Climax of the Crisis: Combat Operations from August 20 to September 4, 1944
6. The Start of the Retreat in the West
7. The Situation around Paris
8. Command Decisions and the Course of Operations Leading to the Climax of the Crisis
9. The Basis for Continued Combat Operations
Part 3. Developments from the Climax of the Crisis until the Transition to Positional Warfare in the West: Combat Operations in September 1944
10. From the Climax of the Crisis to the First Indications of a Stabilization of the Western Front
11. The Situation Estimate Prepared by the Operations Staffs and the Failure of the Concept of a German ‘Counteroffensive from the Move’
12. The End of the Retreat Operations in the West and the Transition to Positional Warfare
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
عن المؤلف
Major General David T. Zabecki, AUS (Ret.), is the author of The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War and editor emeritus of Vietnam magazine. He holds the Shifrin Distinguished Chair in Military and Naval History at the United States Naval Academy and is also an Honorary Senior Research Fellow in the War Studies Programme at the University of Birmingham (United Kingdom).
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