This supplement to the Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (ARSP) covers all of the fundamental aspects of the free will problem, concentrating on questions of criminal and procedural law. In the first section the concept of free will is analyzed and the deterministic approach of Ronald J. Allen is discussed as laid out in his essay ‘Miranda’s Hollow Core’ in the Northwestern Law Review. The section is concluded by Professor Allen’s reply to his critics. Professor Allen’s determinism stands in contrast to the libertarianism of David Hodgson and Friedrich Toepel. The essays of Allan Mc Cay and Juan Pablo Mañalich concentrate on compatibilistic theories.
The second section focuses on a critical analysis of compatibilism. In this context, Angus Menuge also discusses the question of concrete evidence for a free will. Friedrich Toepel examines the relevance of alternative models, and Mateusz Klinowski argues that many of the relevant questions can already be answered by applying logical principles. In both sections, John W. Montgomery also provides rare insights into the theological background of the topic.
A propos de l’auteur
Friedrich Toepel received his Ph D in law at Constance University in 1990 with his book on ‘Causation and Imputation Concerning Negligent Crimes’. He received his ‘Habilitation’ (professorial thesis and state doctorate) at the faculty of law of Bonn University in 1999 with his study on ‘Basic Structures of Expert Evidence in Criminal Procedure’. Since then he has given lectures at the faculties of law in Bonn and Dresden. In 2005–2006 he was a Fulbright scholar at Northwestern University School of Law.
His main areas of research are the theoretical foundations of criminal and procedural law. His publications, also his dissertation and his habilitation study, are characterised by the effort to clarify legal problems with the means of analytic philosophy.