The aim of this collection of papers is to present different philosophical perspectives on the mental, exploring questions about how to define, explain and understand the various kinds of mental acts and processes, and exhibiting, in particular, the contrast between naturalistic and non-naturalistic approaches. There is a long tradition in philosophy of clarifying concepts such as those of thinking, knowing and believing. The task of clarifying these concepts has become ever more important with the major developments that have taken place over the last century in the human and cognitive sciences – most notably, psychology, sociology, linguistics, neurophysiology, AI, and cognitive science itself. In all these sciences, there is a need to delineate the domain of the mental and to elucidate the key concepts and underlying assumptions. This need is widely recognized, but approaches and answers vary significantly. Some stress the representational features involved in most of our mental processes, others the inferential dimension; some stress the necessity of using empirical data, others the need to refine ideas before pursuing and drawing on empirical research. The papers collected in this volume are grouped into four parts, on language and thought, on knowledge, belief and action, on intentionality, and on naturalism. The volume will be welcomed by all those engaged and interested in debates about the mental in philosophy and the human and cognitive sciences.Table of Contents PART I: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHTAndrew Woodfield, Public Words Considered as Vehicles of Thinking Andrea Bianchi, Speaking and Thinking (Or: A More Kaplanian Wayto a Unified Account of Language and Thought)Stefano Predelli, The Strange Case of the Missing Constituent PART II: KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF AND ACTIONPascal Engel, Taking Seriously Knowledge as a Mental State Carlo Gabbani, Epistemology and the Eliminative Stance Jennifer Hornsby, Knowledge, Belief and Reasons for Acting Wolfgang Kuenne, Some Varieties of Deception PART III: INTENTIONALITYSandro Nannini, Intentionality Naturalised Elisabetta Sacchi, Thought and Thinking: the Ontological Ground of Intentionality Elisabeth Pacherie, Is Collective Intentionality Really Primitive?PART IV: NATURALISMMarcello Frixione, Do Concepts exist? A Naturalistic Point of View Tim Crane, Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: the Challengeof the Explanatory Gap Achim Stephan and Robert C. Richardson, What Physicalism Should Provide Us With Mario De Caro, The Claims of Naturalism
Michael Beaney & Carlo Penco
Explaining the Mental [PDF ebook]
Naturalist and Non-Naturalist Approaches to Mental Acts and Processes
Explaining the Mental [PDF ebook]
Naturalist and Non-Naturalist Approaches to Mental Acts and Processes
Achetez cet ebook et obtenez-en 1 de plus GRATUITEMENT !
Format PDF ● Pages 266 ● ISBN 9781443806534 ● Éditeur Michael Beaney & Carlo Penco ● Maison d’édition Cambridge Scholars Publishing ● Publié 2009 ● Téléchargeable 6 fois ● Devise EUR ● ID 2597739 ● Protection contre la copie Adobe DRM
Nécessite un lecteur de livre électronique compatible DRM