Samuel H. Kernell 
Veto Rhetoric [EPUB ebook] 
A Leadership Strategy for Divided Government

While veto threats have a long history, presidents have come to be more reliant on this bargaining tool in the last few decades. 
Veto Rhetoric therefore serves as a nice companion to Sam Kernell′s classic study,  
Going Public, which documented a similar trend with regards to presidential public appeals. Kernell′s current study will no doubt once again lead presidential scholars to rethink how they understand and conceptualizing presidential-congressional relations.

– Joel Sievert, Texas Tech University



In 
Veto Rhetoric
,  Samuel Kernell offers a fresh, more sanguine perspective to understanding national policy making in this era of divided government. Contrary to the standard ‘separation of powers’ representation of the veto which deals presidents a weak ‘take it or leave it’ hand, Kernell shows that veto rhetoric forces Congress to pay careful heed of the president’s objections early in deliberations as legislation is forming. Moreover, the book introduces original statistical analysis to test the argument and extends previously reported analyses to include the Biden presidency. 
Veto Rhetoric
 will change the way students of Congress and the presidency assess their respective roles in making national policy.

Tabella dei contenuti

Chapter 1. Veto Threats’ Questionable Effectiveness

Veto Rhetoric′s Suspect Status

Conclusion

Data Appendix

Chapter 2. Veto Threat Bargaining (VTB)

Veto Rhetoric as Focal Coordination

Fashioning a Threat Signal

Veto Rhetoric′s Three Audiences

The Bicameral Setting

The Game

Politicians Solicit Veto Threats

Conclusion

Chapter 3. Statements of Administration Policy

SAPs as the Primary Venue for Veto Rhetoric

SAPs and the Center of Veto Bargaining

Conclusion

Appendix

Data Appendix

Chapter 4. Veto Threats as Public Events

Establishing the Credibility of Veto Rhetoric

Public Opinion toward Vetoes and Threats

Conclusion

Appendix

Data Appendix

Chapter 5. Veto Rhetoric and the Legislative Process

House Rules Governing Floor Deliberations

Veto Rhetoric and Filibusters

Veto Threats and Roll Call Voting

Veto Signals Change Preferences

Conclusion

Appendix

Chapter 6. Veto Rhetoric’s Impact on Legislation

Bills as Bundles and Provisions

Mapping Changes in Legislation

Hypotheses

Data and Methods

Findings: Does Veto Rhetoric Matter

Conclusion

Appendix

Data Appendix

Chapter 7. A Leadership Strategy for Divided Government

References

Circa l’autore

Samuel Kernell is distinguished emeritus professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, where he has taught since 1977. Kernell’s research interests focus on the presidency, political communication, and American political history. His books include Veto Rhetoric: A Leadership Strategy for Divided Government; Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 4th edition; Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd edition (with Gary C. Jacobson); and Party Ballots, Reform, and the Transformation of America’s Electoral System (with Erik J. Engstrom). He has also edited Parallel Politics: Economic Policymaking in Japan and the United States; The Politics of Divided Government (with Gary W. Cox); and James Madison: The Theory and Practice of Republican Government. He is presently writing an intellectual biography of James H. Rowe.