The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views about truth, such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention, and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these views are in agreement in at least one fundamental respect: they are all alethic monists. They endorse the thesis that there is only one property in virtue of which propositions can be true, and so, in this sense, take truth to be one. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea: there are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. The literature on truth pluralism has been growing steadily for the past twenty years. This volume, however, is the first to focus specifically on pluralism about truth. Part I is dedicated to the development, investigation, and critical discussion of different forms of pluralism. One additional reason to examine truth pluralism is the significant connections it bears to other debates in the truth literature–particularly debates concerning traditional theories of truth and the deflationism/inflationism divide. Parts II and III of the volume connect truth pluralism to these two debates.