Once we came out of the jungle and found time to think of something besides food, sex, and shelter, we confronted the fundamental questions: what are we? Who are we? Is a person a body, a soul? How do we access the external world if we are nothing but brains encased in bodies?
As neuroscientists map the most detailed aspects of the human brain and its interplay with the rest of the body, they remain baffled by what is essentially human: our selves. In most of the existing scientific literature, information processing has taken the place of the soul. Yet thus far, no convincing account has been presented of exactly where and how consciousness is stored in our bodies.
In
The Spread Mind, Riccardo Manzotti convincingly argues that our bodies do not contain subjective experience. Yet consciousness is real, and, like any other real phenomenon, is physical. Where is it, then? Manzotti’s radical hypothesis is that consciousness is one and the same as the physical world surrounding us.
Drawing on Einstein’s theories of relativity, evidence about dreams and hallucination, and the geometry of light in perception, and using vivid, real-world examples to illustrate his ideas, Manzotti argues that consciousness is not a ”movie in the head.” Experience is not in our head: it is the actual world we move in.
Inhoudsopgave
1. The Spread Mind
1.1 What, where and when is experience?
1.2 Experience is the object
1.3 I am world
1.4 A better object?
1.5 Nothing appears, everything takes place
1.6 Appearance is reality
1.7 Shangri-La
2. The Spread Object
2.1 The fridge-light model of the object
2.2 Traditional and actual spread objects
2.3 Senses as multiple objects
2.4 Phenomenal is physical
2.5 The last Ptolemaic stand
2.6 Percipere est esse
3. The causal geometry of experience
3.1 Stretching over space and time
3.2 Glass, mirrors and beyond
3.3 A storage-less model of memory
3.4 Dreams and hallucinations as spatiotemporal kaleidoscopes
3.5 The causal argument revisited
3.6 Return to Shangri-La
4. Illusions
4.1 Proxy and alleged properties
4.2 Illusions as misbeliefs
4.3 A zoo of illusions
4.4 Benham’s Top
4.5 A comparison with other accounts
5. Hallucinations and dreams
5.1 Ordinary and extraordinary hallucinations
5.2 Gerrymandered objects and direct brain stimulation
5.3 Double preemption
5.4 A continuum – from objects to hallucinations
5.5 The common kind assumption
6. A zoo of objects and experiences
6.1 The myth of endogenous mental experience
6.2 Phosphenes and blindness
6.3 Visual images and congenitally blinds
6.4 Geometric hallucinations
6.5 Impossible, forbidden and Martian colors
6.6 Additions and subtractions
6.7 Afterimages
6.8 The myth of supersaturated red
6.9 Filling in
6.10 Innate phantom limbs
7. Joint causation and wholes
7.1 Actual existence
7.2 Objects and wholes
7.3 Joint causation
7.4 No time, no wholes
7.5 The cause of the cause is the effect
8. The spread now
8.1 The present is not punctual
8.2 The spread now
8.3 Now is relative and multiple
8.4 Present is near past and past is far present
8.5 Pastness has no color
8.6 The time-gap argument
8.7 Time is an ocean, the present is its shore
9. In nature, identity is the only relation
9.1 A is A
9.2 Thou shalt have no other relations before me
9.3 Kinds of representations
9.4 Brains as world makers
10. Look at the universe and you’ll see yourself
References
Over de auteur
RICCARDO MANZOTTI is a Professor in Psychology at the Institute of Human, Language and Environmental Sciences at the University of Milan. He holds a Ph D in robotics, is the author of 50 papers on the basis of consciousness, and is the webmaster of consciousness.it. A former Fulbright Visiting Scholar at MIT, Manzotti is associate editor for the International Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Medicine.