In this ambitious exploration of how foreign trade policy is made in democratic regimes, Daniel Verdier shows that special interests, party ideologues, and state officials and diplomats act as agents of the voters. Constructing a general theory in which existing theories (rent-seeking, median voting, state autonomy) function as partial explanations, he shows that trade institutions are not fixed entities but products of political competition.
Sobre o autor
Daniel Verdier is Professor of Political Science at the European University Institute, Florence.
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Língua Inglês ● Formato PDF ● Páginas 408 ● ISBN 9780691228181 ● Tamanho do arquivo 26.6 MB ● Editora Princeton University Press ● Cidade Princeton ● País US ● Publicado 2021 ● Carregável 24 meses ● Moeda EUR ● ID 7728710 ● Proteção contra cópia Adobe DRM
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