This book repairs and revives the
Theory of Knowledge research program of Russell’s
Principia era. Chapter 1, ‘Introduction and Overview’, explains the program’s agenda. Inspired by the non-Fregean logicism of
Principia Mathematica, it endorses the revolution within mathematics presenting it as a study of relations. The synthetic a
priori logic of
Principia is the essence of philosophy considered as a science which exposes the dogmatisms about abstract particulars and metaphysical necessities that create prisons that fetter the mind. Incipient in
The
Problems of Philosophy, the program’s acquaintance epistemology embraced a multiple-relation theory of belief. It reached an impasse in 1913, having been itself retrofitted with abstract particular
logical forms to address problems of
direction and compositionality. With its acquaintance epistemology in limbo,
Scientific Method in Philosophy became the sequel to
Problems. Chapter 2 explains Russell’s feeling intellectually dishonest. Wittgenstein’s demand that
logic exclude nonsense belief played no role. The 1919
neutral monist era ensued, but Russell found no epistemology for the logic essential to philosophy. Repairing, Chapters 4–6 solve the impasse. Reviving, Chapters 3 and 7 vigorously defend the facts about
Principia. Studies of modality and entailment are viable while
Principia remains a
universal logic above the civil wars of the metaphysicians.
Tabela de Conteúdo
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview.- Chapter 2: what is Logic?.- Chapter 3: Facts About Principia.- Chapter 4: Acquaintance.- Chapter 5: Direction.- Chapter 6: Compositionality.- Chapter 7: Scientific Philosophy’s Necessity.
Sobre o autor
Gregory Landini is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa, USA. His research interests include philosophy of logic, metaphysics, modal logic, foundations of mathematics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and the history of early analytic philosophy. His books include: Frege’s Notations: What They Are and How They Mean (2012), Russell (2010), Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell (2007) and Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory (1998).