Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual
experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in
this collection address these questions together with other
fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content.
* The book draws together papers by leading international
philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva
Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St
Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael Tye (University of
Texas, Austin), Richard Price (All Souls College, Oxford) and
Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)
* Essays address the central questions surrounding the content of
perceptual experience
* Investigates how are we able to determine the admissible
contents of experience
* Published in association with the journal Philosophical
Quarterly
Tabela de Conteúdo
Introduction (Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow).
1. Perception And The Reach Of Phenomenal Content (Tim Bayne,
University of Oxford).
2. Seeing Causings And Hearing Gestures (Steven
Butterfill, University of Warwick).
3. Experience And Content (Alex Byrne, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology).
4. Is Perception A Propositional Attitude? (Tim Crane,
University College London).
5. Conscious Reference (Alva Noë, University of
California, Berkeley).
6. What Are The Contents Of Experiences? (Adam Pautz,
University of Texas at Austin).
7. Aspect-Switching And Visual Phenomenal Character (Richard
Price, University of Oxford).
8. The Visual Experience Of Causation (Susanna Siegel,
Harvard University).
9. The Admissible Contents Of Visual Experience (Michael Tye,
University of Texas at Austin).
Index.
Sobre o autor
Katherine Hawley is Professor of Philosophy at the
University of St Andrews and Editorial Chair of the
Philosophical Quarterly. She has published articles in
metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of science, and is the
author of How Things Persist (2001).
Fiona Macpherson is Senior Lecturer and Director of the
Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience, University of
Glasgow. She has recently also been a Research Fellow at the Centre
for Consciousness, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian
National University. She has published articles in philosophy of
mind, psychology and perception and is a co-editor (with Adrian
Haddock) of Disjunctivism: Perception, Action,
Knowledge (2008).