Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen 
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind [PDF ebook] 

Notes on Contributors ix
Introduction Jonathan Cohen xii
Part I Mental Content 1
Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3
1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions Gabriel Segal 5
2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content Sarah Sawyer 20
Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 35
3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent Anthony Brueckner 37
4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent Michael Mc Kinsey 53
Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 67
5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology Georges Rey 69
6 Normativism Defended Ralph Wedgwood 85
Is There Non-Conceptual Content? 103
7 The Revenge of the Given Jerry Fodor 105
8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? Richard G. Heck Jr 117
Part II Physicalism 139
Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable? 141
9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism Louise Antony 143
10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism Paul M. Churchland 160
Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 183
11 A Priori Physicalism Frank Jackson 185
12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism Brian P. Mc Laughlin 200
Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 225
13 Causation and Mental Causation Jaegwon Kim 227
14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough Barry Loewer 243
Part III The Place Of Consciousness In Nature 265
Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 267
15 Dualist Emergentism Martine Nida-Rümelin 269
16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness David Braddon-Mitchell 287
Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 301
17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak Michael Tye 303
18 A Case for Qualia Sydney Shoemaker 319
Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 333
19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual Jesse Prinz 335
20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) Christopher Peacocke 358
Index 377

Brian P. Mc Laughlin is Professor and Chair in the philosophy
department at Rutgers University. He has published widely in
philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and is the co-editor of
the classic collection on the philosophy of Donald Davidson,
Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald
Davidson (Blackwell, 1988), editor of Dretske and His
Critics (Blackwell, 1991) and the forthcoming Oxford
Handbook of Philosophy of Mind.
Jonathan Cohen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at
the University of California, San Diego. He is the the author of
numerous papers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology,
philosophy of language, metaphysics, and perception. Much of his
recent work has focused on the metaphysics of color properties.