In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American
history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.
สารบัญ
Introduction PART I: ‘THE BIG VICTORY, THE GREAT TASK’
1. The Communist Debate over Strategy
2. Preparations, and Objectives of the Tet Offensive PART II: THE ORIGINS OF SURPRISE
3. The Sources of American Biases
4. Missing the Signals: July–November 1967
5. Missing the Signals: December 1967–30 January 1968
6. Reacting to the Tet Offensive Conclusion: Explaining the Failure of IntelligenceBibliography
Index
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