Kristan Stoddart reveals for the first time discussions that took place between the British, French and US governments for nuclear cooperation in the early to mid 1970s. In doing so it sets the scene for the upgrade to Britain’s Polaris force codenamed Chevaline and how this could have brought down Harold Wilson’s Labour government of 1974-1976.
สารบัญ
Introduction 1. The Heath government and the Not So Special Relationship, 1970-1974 2. The ‘special nuclear relationship’ under Heath, 1970-1974 3. Britain, NATO’s Evolving Military Doctrine and its Nuclear Planning Group: the Balance between the Sword and the Shield, 1970-1974 4. National Strategy and Multilateral Priorities:British ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Operations, 1970-1974 5. The Last Wilson Governments and Strategic Nuclear Deterrence, 1974-1976 6. Nuclear Testing and the Practicalities of Moving Chevaline to Completion, 1974-1976 7. Britain, America and NATO Modernisation, 1974-1976 8. Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Operational Employment and Conventional Defence, 1974-1976 Conclusion
เกี่ยวกับผู้แต่ง
Kristan Stoddart is Lecturer in Cyber Security in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, UK. He previously worked at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton, UK.
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