This book articulates an African conception of dignity in light of the salient axiological category of personhood in African cultures. The idea of personhood embodies a moral system for evaluating human lives exuding with virtue or ones that are morally excellent. This book argues that this idea of personhood embodies an under-explored conception of dignity, which accounts for it in terms of our capacity for the virtue of sympathy. It then proceeds to apply this personhood-based conception of dignity to bioethical questions, specifically, those of abortion and euthanasia. Regarding abortion, it concludes that it is impermissible since foetuses possess partial moral status. Regarding euthanasia, it argues that it is permissible for reasons revolving around avoiding the reversing of personhood. It also, though, minimally, touches on the questions regarding the mentally disabled and animals, to which it assigns lower moral status.
สารบัญ
Chapter 1: Introduction: Personhood, Dignity and (African) Bioethics.- Chapter 2: Personhood, Morality and Dignity in African Philosophy.- Chapter 3: Personhood and Abortion in African Philosophy.- Chapter 4: Personhood and Euthanasia in African Philosophy.
เกี่ยวกับผู้แต่ง
Motsamai Molefe is a senior researcher at the University of Fort Hare, South Africa.
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