In a short chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason entitled “On the Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgment, ” Kant addresses a crucial problem facing his theory of moral judgment: How can we represent the supersensible moral law so as to apply it to actions in the sensible world? Despite its importance to Kant”s project, previous studies of the Typic have been fragmentary, disparate, and contradictory.
This book provides a detailed commentary on the Typic, elucidating how it enables moral judgment by means of the law of nature, which serves as the ”type”, or analogue, of the moral law. In addition, the book situates the Typic, both historically and conceptually, within Kant”s theory of symbolic representation. While many commentators have assimilated the Typic to the aesthetic notion of ”symbolic hypotyposis” in the third Critique, the author contends that it has greater continuities with the theoretical notion of ”symbolic anthropomorphism” in the Prolegomena.
As the first comprehensive, book-length study of the Typic that critically engages with the secondary literature, this monograph fills an important gap in the research on Kant”s ethics and aesthetics and provides a starting point for further inquiry and debate.