Does perception provide us with direct and unmediated access to the world around us? The so-called ‘argument from illusion ‘ has traditionally been supposed to show otherwise: from the subject’s point of view, perceptual illusions are often indistinguishable from veridical perceptions; hence, perceptual experience, as such, cannot provide us with knowledge of the world, but only with knowledge of how things appear to us. Disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, first proposed by John Mc Dowell and Paul Snowdon in the early 1980s and at the centre of current debates in the philosophy of perception, have been proposed to block this argument. According to the traditional view, a case of perception and a subjectively indistinguishable illusion or hallucination can exemplify what is fundamentally the same kind of mental state even though they differ in how they relate to the non-mental environment. In contrast, according to the disjunctive account, the concept of perceptual experience should be seen as essentially disjunctive, encompassing (at least) two distinct kinds of mental states, namely genuinely world-involving perceptions and mere appearances. This book presents seven recent essays on disjunctivism first published in two special issues of Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action.
Marcus Willaschek
Disjunctivism [EPUB ebook]
Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception
Disjunctivism [EPUB ebook]
Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception
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Dil İngilizce ● Biçim EPUB ● Sayfalar 176 ● ISBN 9781135739676 ● Editör Marcus Willaschek ● Yayımcı Taylor and Francis ● Yayınlanan 2013 ● İndirilebilir 3 kez ● Döviz EUR ● Kimlik 7117052 ● Kopya koruma Adobe DRM
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