Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Constraining Discretion in Bank Regulation; 3. Fallacies and Irrelevant Facts in the Discussion of Capital Regulation; 4. Complexity, Interconnectedness: Business Models and the Basel System; 5. At the Brink of Insolvency: Shallow Recapitalization Exercise Fails to Bolster Europe’s Ailing Banks; 6. Bank Resolution in Comparative Perspective: What Lessons for Europe?; 7. Resolving Problem Banks: A Review of the Global Evidence; 8. Bank Resolution in New Zealand and Its Implications for Europe; 9. Collateral and Monetary Policy; 10. The ECB and the Political Economy of Collateral; 11. The Backstory of the Risk-Free Asset: How Government Debt Become “Safe”; 12. Central Banking Post-Crisis: What Compass for Uncharted Waters?; 13. Reconceptualising Central Bank Unconventional Policies: Long Positions on No-Growth Capitalism; 14. The Future Relationship between Central Banks and Governments: What Are Central Banks For?; 15. Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation?; Contributors; Index

Charles Goodhart is director of the Financial Regulation Research Programme at the London School of Economics.
Daniela Gabor is an associate professor at the University of the West of England in Bristol.
Jakob Vestergaard is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies in Denmark.
Ismail Ertürk is a senior lecturer at Manchester Business School at the University of Manchester, UK.