Markus Seidel provides a detailed critique of epistemic relativism in the sociology of scientific knowledge. In addition to scrutinizing the main arguments for epistemic relativism he provides an absolutist account that nevertheless aims at integrating the relativist’s intuition.
Зміст
Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Setting the stage: Epistemic Relativism in the Strong Programme and Beyond 2. Realism and the Argument from Underdetermination 3. Norm-circularity 4. Epistemic Absolutism that Explains the Relativist’s Intuition Summary and Outlook Glossary Bibliography Index
Про автора
Markus Seidel is a Postdoctoral Researcher and Lecturer at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Münster, Germany. His research focuses on general philosophy of science, epistemology, sociology of science and sociology of knowledge.