For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army.Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author’s personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.
Mục lục
Preface
1. Military Doctrine and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency
2. Culture, Doctrine, and Military Professionalization
3. ‘The Habits and Usages of War’: U.S. Army Professionalization, 1865–1962
4. From the Halls of Montezuma: Marine Corps Professionalization, 1865–1960
5. A Family of Regiments: British Army Professionalization, 1856–1948
6. ‘A Nasty, Untidy Mess’: U.S. Counterinsurgency in Vietnam, 1960–71
7. A Natural Experiment in I Corps, 1966–68
8. Out of Africa: British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya, 1952–56
9. Counterinsurgency in the Land of Two Rivers: The Americans and British in Iraq, 2003–8
10. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2003–11
Conclusions
Giới thiệu về tác giả
Austin Long is an Assistant Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs and a Member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and the Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies at Columbia University. He was an analyst and advisor to Coalition forces in Iraq (2007–2008) and Afghanistan (2011 and 2013). He is author of On ‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research.
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