While veto threats have a long history, presidents have come to be more reliant on this bargaining tool in the last few decades.
Veto Rhetoric therefore serves as a nice companion to Sam Kernell′s classic study,
Going Public, which documented a similar trend with regards to presidential public appeals. Kernell′s current study will no doubt once again lead presidential scholars to rethink how they understand and conceptualizing presidential-congressional relations.
– Joel Sievert, Texas Tech University
In
Veto Rhetoric
, Samuel Kernell offers a fresh, more sanguine perspective to understanding national policy making in this era of divided government. Contrary to the standard ‘separation of powers’ representation of the veto which deals presidents a weak ‘take it or leave it’ hand, Kernell shows that veto rhetoric forces Congress to pay careful heed of the president’s objections early in deliberations as legislation is forming. Moreover, the book introduces original statistical analysis to test the argument and extends previously reported analyses to include the Biden presidency.
Veto Rhetoric
will change the way students of Congress and the presidency assess their respective roles in making national policy.
Mục lục
Chapter 1. Veto Threats’ Questionable Effectiveness
Veto Rhetoric′s Suspect Status
Conclusion
Data Appendix
Chapter 2. Veto Threat Bargaining (VTB)
Veto Rhetoric as Focal Coordination
Fashioning a Threat Signal
Veto Rhetoric′s Three Audiences
The Bicameral Setting
The Game
Politicians Solicit Veto Threats
Conclusion
Chapter 3. Statements of Administration Policy
SAPs as the Primary Venue for Veto Rhetoric
SAPs and the Center of Veto Bargaining
Conclusion
Appendix
Data Appendix
Chapter 4. Veto Threats as Public Events
Establishing the Credibility of Veto Rhetoric
Public Opinion toward Vetoes and Threats
Conclusion
Appendix
Data Appendix
Chapter 5. Veto Rhetoric and the Legislative Process
House Rules Governing Floor Deliberations
Veto Rhetoric and Filibusters
Veto Threats and Roll Call Voting
Veto Signals Change Preferences
Conclusion
Appendix
Chapter 6. Veto Rhetoric’s Impact on Legislation
Bills as Bundles and Provisions
Mapping Changes in Legislation
Hypotheses
Data and Methods
Findings: Does Veto Rhetoric Matter
Conclusion
Appendix
Data Appendix
Chapter 7. A Leadership Strategy for Divided Government
References
Giới thiệu về tác giả
Samuel Kernell is distinguished emeritus professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, where he has taught since 1977. Kernell’s research interests focus on the presidency, political communication, and American political history. His books include Veto Rhetoric: A Leadership Strategy for Divided Government; Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 4th edition; Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd edition (with Gary C. Jacobson); and Party Ballots, Reform, and the Transformation of America’s Electoral System (with Erik J. Engstrom). He has also edited Parallel Politics: Economic Policymaking in Japan and the United States; The Politics of Divided Government (with Gary W. Cox); and James Madison: The Theory and Practice of Republican Government. He is presently writing an intellectual biography of James H. Rowe.
Thêm sách điện tử từ cùng một tác giả / Biên tập viên
118.562 Ebooks trong thể loại này
