Few people, if any, still argue that science in all its aspects is a value-free endeavor. At the very least, values affect decisions about the choice of research problems to investigate and the uses to which the results of research are applied. But what about the actual doing of science?<i>As Science, Values, and Objectivity</i> reveals, the connections and interactions between values and science are quite complex. The essays in this volume <i>Theory and Method in the Neurosciences</i> surveys the nature and structure of theories in contemporary neuroscience, exploring many of its methodological techniques and problems. The essays in this volume from the Pittsburgh -Konstanz series explore basic questions about how to relate theories of neuroscience and cognition, the multilevel character of such theories, and their experimental bases. Philosophers and scientists (and some who are both) examine the topics of explanation and mechanisms, simulation and computation, imaging and animal models that raise questions about the forefront of research in cognitive neuroscience. Their work will stimulate new thinking in anyone interested in the mind or brain and in recent theories of their connections.identify the crucial values that play a role in science, distinguish some of the criteria that can be used for value identification, and elaborate the conditions for warranting certain values as necessary or central to the very activity of scientific research.Recently, social constructivists have taken the presence of values within the scientific model to question the basis of objectivity. However, the contributors to <i>Science, Values, and Objectivity</i> recognize that such acknowledgment of the role of values does not negate the fact that objects exist in the world. Objects have the power to constrain our actions and thoughts, though the norms for these thoughts lie in the public, social world.Values may be decried or defended, praised or blamed, but in a world that strives for a modicum of reason, values, too, must be reasoned. Critical assessment of the values that play a role in scientific research is as much a part of doing good science as interpreting data.
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<b>Peter Machamer</b> is professor of history and philosophy of science at the University of Pittsburgh. He is coeditor, with Gereon Wolters, of <i>Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics</i> and <i>Science, Values, and Objectivity, </i> among other books.