In the late eighties and early nineties, driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned during military operations, United States policy makers made intelligence support to the military the Intelligence Community’s top priority. In response to this demand, the CIA and Do D instituted policy and organizational changes that altered their relationship with one another. While debates over the future of the Intelligence Community were occurring on Capitol Hill, the CIA and Do D were expanding their relationship in peacekeeping and nation-building operations in Somalia and the Balkans.
By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far. In Subordinating Intelligence: The Do D/CIA Post–Cold War Relationship, David P. Oakley reveals that, despite these concerns, no major changes to national intelligence or its priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers increasingly focused on tactical and operational actions. As policy makers became fixated with terrorism and the United States fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CIA directed a significant amount of its resources toward global counterterrorism efforts and in support of military operations.
表中的内容
Change on the Horizon
The Gulf War
The Guld War’s Aftermath: From Victory to Vitriol
End of the Cold War and the Continuation of Reform
‘It’s the Economy, Stupid’: The Clinton Years and Intelligence Reform
A New Administration
9/11 and the Global War on Terror
Everything Comes with a Cost: Improved Operations, Organization Subordination, and Strategic Shortfalls
关于作者
David P. Oakley is a former army and CIA officer who currently serves as a faculty member at Special Operations Command’s Joint Special Operations University in Tampa, Florida.
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