Since September 11, 2001, the CIA and Do D have operated together in Afghanistan, Iraq, and during counterterrorism operations. Although the global war on terrorism gave the CIA and Do D a common purpose, it was actions taken in the late eighties and early nineties that set the foundation for their current relationship. Driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned during military operations, policy makers made intelligence support to the military the Intelligence Community’s top priority. In response to this demand, the CIA/Do D instituted policy and organizational changes that altered the CIA/Do D relationship. While debates over the future of the Intelligence Community were occurring on Capitol Hill, the CIA and Do D were expanding their relationship in peacekeeping and nation-building operations in Somalia and the Balkans.By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far, weakening the long-term analysis required for strategy and policy development. In Subordinating Intelligence: The Do D/CIA Post–Cold War Relationship, David P. Oakley reveals that, despite these concerns, no major changes to either national intelligence organization or its priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers increasingly focused on tactical and operational actions. As policy makers became fixated with terrorism and the United States fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CIA directed a significant amount of its resources toward global counterterrorism efforts and in support of military operations.
来自同一作者的更多电子书 / 编辑
231,255 此类电子书
