Israel’s relations with each of the superpowers was determined by global factors. The dilemma facing Israel was how to reconcile its interests with those of the United States, having failed to do so with the Soviet Union. Moreover, throughout the cold war the United States considered Israel a burden rather than an asset and had to accommodate support for Israel with keeping the Arab states within the western orbit. Partisan policy could have dealt a mortal blow to the fundamental assumption of American global strategy. Namely that the Middle East should not be allowed to become a cold war arena. The book shows how the fledgling state of Israel had to manoeuvre between the superpowers to survive.
表中的内容
Introduction
1. The Soviet Union and Israel: from the Gromyko declaration to the death of Stalin
2. The United States and the Cold War: from Truman to Eisenhower
3. Israel and the Soviet Union prior to the Suez Crisis
4. Sharett vs. Eisenhower and Dulles
5. Israel and the United States on the road to war
6. The Eisenhower doctrine and Israel
7. Soviet-Israeli relations after the Suez war
8. How the Middle Eastern crises affected American policy toward Israel
9. Kennedy, Israel and the Cold War before the Cuban Missile Crisis
10. Was Kennedy the ‘father’ of the US-Israeli alliance?
11. Khrushchev, Israel and Soviet Jewry
12. Was Johnson the ‘father’ of the US-Israeli alliance?: the Memorandum of Understanding
13. Johnson, Israel and the Cold War: testing the Memorandum of Understanding
14. The Soviet Union, Israel and Soviet Jewry
15. The United States and the crisis of the Six Day War
16. The Soviet Union and the Six Day War (May 14-June 5, 1967)
Conclusions
Index
关于作者
Joseph Heller is Professor Emeritus in International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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