This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct–one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism–then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
€31.46
购买此电子书可免费获赠一本！
语言 英语 ● 格式 PDF ● ISBN 9780198036234 ● 出版者 Oxford University Press ● 发布时间 2003 ● 下载 6 时 ● 货币 EUR ● ID 2279627 ● 复制保护 Adobe DRM
需要具备DRM功能的电子书阅读器
来自同一作者的更多电子书 / 编辑
49,055 此类电子书
