This book explains why international donors may succeed in putting war-torn countries on the path of democratic transition and negative peace, but fail to consolidate the gains they make. Critical of neo-institutionalism, but sympathetic to historical and normative institutionalism, this book advances ‘complex realist institutionalism’ theory.
Table des matières
Introduction PART I: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK Democratic Regime Consolidation & International Democracy Assistance Institutional Structure & Structural Challenges Research Methodology: Cambodia as Case Study PART II: POWER VS. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION Electoral Procedural Rules under Constraint Liberal Norms under Stress Liberty under Pressure PART III: THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION State Institutions’ Underdevelopment Political Society’s Underdevelopment Civil Society’s Underdevelopment PART IV: STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES TO INSTITUTIONALIZATION Non-Material Constraints Economic Impediments Political Impediments PART V: THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE Limits of Assistance for Institution Building Limits of Economic Assistance Limits of Political Assistance Conclusion: Toward Complex Realist Institutionalism
A propos de l’auteur
SORPONG PEOU is Professor of International Security at Sophia University, Japan. He has written on Cambodian politics, international peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and regional security in Pacific Asia.