The post-Cold War era has witnessed a dramatic transformation in the German political consensus about the legitimacy of the use of force. However, in comparison with its EU and NATO partners, Germany has been reticent to transform its military to meet the challenges of the contemporary security environment. Until 2003 territorial defence rather than crisis-management remained the armed forces’ core role and the Bundeswehr continues to retain conscription. The book argues that ‘strategic culture’ provides only a partial explanation of German military reform. It demonstrates how domestic material factors were of crucial importance in shaping the pace and outcome of reform, despite the impact of ‘international structure’ and adaptational pressures from the EU and NATO. The domestic politics of base closures, ramifications for social policy, financial restrictions consequent upon German unification and commitment to EMU’s Stability and Growth Pact were critical in determining the outcome of reform. The study also draws out the important role of policy leaders in the political management of reform as entrepreneurs, brokers or veto players, shifting the focus in German leadership studies away from a preoccupation with the Chancellor to the role of ministerial and administrative leadership within the core executive. Finally, the book contributes to our understanding of the Europeanization of the German political system, arguing that policy leaders played a key role in ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ processes to and from the EU and that Defence Ministers used ‘Atlanticization’ and ‘Europeanization’ in the interests of their domestic political agendas.
Inhoudsopgave
Acknowledgements
Figures and Tables
List of Abbreviations
Chapter 1. Explaining the Paradox of German Defense Policy 1990–2005
- Germany in Context: Military Reform in Britain and France
- Explaining the Paradox: Leadership and Culture as a Political Resource
- The Concept of Policy Leadership
- Leadership and Policy Studies in Germany
Chapter 2. The Bundeswehr in its Historical and Structural Context: The Scope for Policy Leadership
- The Bundeswehr Policy Subsystem
- Interlocking and Nested Policy Subsystems: Defense, Security, Foreign, and Budgetary Policy
- The Three Coalitions in Defense and Security Policy During the Cold War
- The Post-Cold War World: Unification, New Security Threats, and Responding to U.S. Power
- Conclusion
Chapter 3. Policy Leadership and Bundeswehr Reform During the Kohl Chancellorships: The Art of Varying and Sequencing Roles
- From the Gulf War to Sarajevo: Helmut Kohl as Policy Leader
- Developing the Crisis Intervention Role of the Bundeswehr: Volker Rühe as Policy Entrepreneur and Broker 1992–94
- The Structure of the Bundeswehr and the Politics of Base Closures: Volker Rühe as Policy Broker and Veto Player 1994–98
- Leadership within the Defense Ministry: Denkverbot and the Control of Policy Learning
- Contenders for the Role of Policy Entrepreneur on Bundeswehr Reform: Klaus Kinkel, the Foreign Ministry, the FDP, and the Greens
- Adapting to Rühe: The SPD and the Deferral of Bundeswehr Reform
- Conclusions
Chapter 4. Policy Leadership on Bundeswehr Reform During First the Schröder Chancellorship 1998–2002: Managing ‘Government by Commission’
- Fanning the Flames of Policy Learning: The Weizsäcker Commission
- The Strategic Context of Bundeswehr Reform: Base Closures, Social Policy, and the CDU/CSU Opposition
- Rudolf Scharping as Policy Leader: The Marginalisation of the Weizsäcker Commission and the Control of Policy Learning
- Policy Leadership and the Unsuccessful Implementation of Reform
- Conclusions
Chapter 5. Bundeswehr Reform During the Second Schröder Chancellorship 2002–05: The Art of Combining Leadership Roles
- The Parameters of Reform: Domestic Politics and the ‘Need for New Think’
- Struck and the Defense Policy Guidelines (VPR): ‘Germany Will be Defended on the Hindukush’
- Combining Leadership Roles to Build Consensus at the Macropolitical Level
- Struck as Policy Veto Player on Structural Reform: Political Timing and the Control of Policy Learning
- Conclusions
Chapter 6. Military Reform, NATO, and The Common European Security and Defense Policy: Between Atlanticization and Europeanization
- Theories of Europeanization and German Defense and Security Policy
- The EU and German Defense and Security Policy During the Kohl Chancellorship
- Fischer, Scharping, and Europeanization: The Legacy of Opposition
- Europeanization versus Atlanticization in the Defense Ministry: The Problem of Institutional Credibility
- Conclusion: A Disjointed Discourse
Chapter 7. A Laggard in Military Reform: The Arts of Policy Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraints over International Opportunity
- Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint
- The Implications for German Leadership Studies
- The Concept of Strategic Culture: Resource as Well as Constraint
- Europeanization: Leadership and the Management of ‘Fit’
Bibliography
Index
Over de auteur
Tom Dyson is a Lecturer at the University of Surrey, having previously worked as an ESRC Research Fellow at the International Relations Department, London School of Economics and as a Visiting Lecturer at the LSE’s Department of Government. He has published articles on German foreign and security policy in European Security and the British Core Executive in the Second World War in Contemporary British History.
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