Aristotle offers a searing rejection of Plato’s commitment to a Form of the Good; core among his complaints is that goodness is not univocal, that is, that there is no single essence-specifying account of goodness covering all the many varieties of goodness there are. Aristotle’s anti-Platonic arguments have been variously received: many of his readers regard them as wholly successful while many others maintain they are abject failures. This volume reconstructs and assesses these arguments afresh and asks a simple question: if they are sound, what is left for Aristotle? In particular, what principles does he have to vouchsafe the commensurability of the good things he himself regards as commensurable?
Cumpărați această carte electronică și primiți încă 1 GRATUIT!
Limba Engleză ● Format PDF ● Pagini 304 ● ISBN 9780198915706 ● Editura OUP Oxford ● Publicat 2024 ● Descărcabil 3 ori ● Valută EUR ● ID 9513601 ● Protecție împotriva copiilor Adobe DRM
Necesită un cititor de ebook capabil de DRM