Aristotle offers a searing rejection of Plato’s commitment to a Form of the Good; core among his complaints is that goodness is not univocal, that is, that there is no single essence-specifying account of goodness covering all the many varieties of goodness there are. Aristotle’s anti-Platonic arguments have been variously received: many of his readers regard them as wholly successful while many others maintain they are abject failures. This volume reconstructs and assesses these arguments afresh and asks a simple question: if they are sound, what is left for Aristotle? In particular, what principles does he have to vouchsafe the commensurability of the good things he himself regards as commensurable?
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Ngôn ngữ Anh ● định dạng PDF ● Trang 304 ● ISBN 9780198915706 ● Nhà xuất bản OUP Oxford ● Được phát hành 2024 ● Có thể tải xuống 3 lần ● Tiền tệ EUR ● TÔI 9513601 ● Sao chép bảo vệ Adobe DRM
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