First published in 1986 and lauded by historians and World War II buffs eager for the Japanese viewpoint, this collection of essays makes significant contributions to the field of World War II literature. In it, top-ranking Japanese officers offer their personal perspectives of the Pacific War. This second edition adds five articles to the original twelve to present a full picture of the Japanese navy’s role in the war.
Most of these moving accounts were written in the 1950s and retain the immediacy felt by the writers when they participated in the events. They provide valuable information on the strategy, tactics, and operations of the Japanese fleet, as well as insights into the personalities and motives of its leaders. Here, Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome comes to grips with allegations that the assault on Pearl Harbor represented strategic folly, political blundering, and tactical stupidity. Captain Mitsuo Fuchida describes how his bombing group unleashed “devils of doom” on Battleship Row, and Mitsuru Yoshida gives an eye-witness account of the sinking of the famous battleship Yamato. The new contributions to the volume discuss operations in the Indian Ocean, the battle of the Philippine Sea, the protection of merchant shipping, submarine warfare, and Japan’s overall naval strategy.
Despre autor
DAVID C. EVANS (1940–1999) served in the U.S. Navy as an ensign and a lieutenant (junior grade), USNR. He taught history at the University of Virginia and was the associate dean of the School of Arts and Sciences. He is the co-author of
Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941.