Andre Blais & Stephane Dion 
The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat [PDF ebook] 
Appraisals and Evidence

Thirteen scholars reexamine one of the most provocative and debated models of bureaucratic behavior, as developed by William A. Niskanen in his seminal book, <i>Bureaucracy and Representative Government.</i> The essays evaluate a wide array of findings, both qualitative and quantitative, relevant to the various aspects of the model, and offer conclusions about its merits and limits, suggesting alternative explanations of bureaucratic behavior. Niskanen provides his own reassessment and reflections on the debate.

关于作者

<b>Andre Blais</b> is professor of political science and fellow with the Centre de recherche et developpement en economique at the Universite de Montreal. He has published twelve books and more than one hundred articles in journals such as the <i>American Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies</i>, and <i>Public Choice</i>. He was a member of the editorial board of the International Encyclopedia of Elections, and he is the principal co-investigator of the Canadian Election Study.