This book addresses the under-researched discourse of the evolution of Chinese nuclear posture, and in particular, explains the absence from this evolution of a coherent and well-defined operational doctrine. Using a neoclassical realist framework, the book explains why China, after having launched a crash programme in the mid-1950s to develop a nuclear deterrent, did not debate a clear operational doctrine with respect to targeting and employment until the mid-1980s.
表中的内容
1. Introduction: Competing explanations for the underdevelopment of China’s nuclear doctrine.- 2. A neoclassical realist approach to military doctrines.- 3. China’s nuclear programme: Origins and progress.- 4. Nuclear doctrine as a continuation of factional politics by other means, 1964-1971.- 5. Elite stability and nuclear doctrine formulation, 1978-1989.- 6. Conclusions.
关于作者
Paolo Rosa is Professor of Political Science at the School of International Studies of the University of Trento, Italy. He is an associate of the EU Non-proliferation Consortium. His main research interests include Foreign Policy Analysis, Italian Foreign and Military Behaviour, Chinese Politics, Strategic Culture, Quantitative Analysis of Conflicts, and Peace Research.
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