Concentrating on U.S. concerns for credibility abroad, Stueck uses recently declassified documents and many interviews to analyze the origins of the Sino-American confrontation in Korea in late 1950. He demonstrates how personalities (Secretary of State Marshall and General Mac Arthur) and bureaucracies (the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) influenced policy development and how congressional penny-pinching reduced prospects for a prudent American course in Korea.
Originally published in 1981.
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