Argues that autonomous agencies are not the result of a systematic design, but are produced by the interactions of political and bureaucratic forces. The case studies illustrate how political struggles between politicians and bureaucrats can create a muddle of agencies that lack coherence and are subject to conflicting levels of political control.
Table of Content
Introduction A Power-Centred Framework for Empirical Analysis Zugzwang: Agency Creation and Bureaucratic Reaction Institutions, Coalitions and Struggles in the Mexican Federal Bureaucracy An Overview of the Mexican Autonomous Agencies Constellation The Central Bank The Federal Telecommunication Commission The Energy Regulatory Commission Conclusion Bibliography
About the author
CRISTOPHER BALLINAS VALDÉS is Associate Professor in Public Policy, at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Mexico City, Mexico. He specialises in the study of executive government and the effects of politics and institutions on policy outcomes – the politics of policies. He has also worked as Senior Adviser to three deputy ministers at the central government in Mexico and possesses extensive high-level experience in policy design and implementation.
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